## **United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois** Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other Sidney I. Schenkier or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge CASE NUMBER 01 C 1198 **DATE** 3/12/2002 **CASE** CRAWFORD vs. BARNHART TITLE [In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature of the motion being presented.] MOTION: DOCKET ENTRY: (1)Filed motion of [ use listing in "Motion" box above.] (2) Brief in support of motion due \_\_\_\_\_. Answer brief to motion due . Reply to answer brief due . (3)Ruling/Hearing on set for at . (4) Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at . (5) Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on \_\_\_\_\_\_ set for \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_. (6) Trial[set for/re-set for] on \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_. (7) (8)[Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_. This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to] (9)☐ FRCP4(m) $\square$ General Rule 21 $\square$ FRCP41(a)(1) $\square$ FRCP41(a)(2). Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. For reasons stated in the attached (10)[Other docket entry] Memorandum Opinion and Order the Court grants the Government's motion for remand (doc. #26). Plaintiff's motion for summary reversal and/or remand (doc. #23) is denied as moot. This case is remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S. C. § 405(g), for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order. (11)[For further detail see order (on reverse side of/attached to) the original minute order.] No notices required, advised in open court. Document Number No notices required. Notices mailed by judge's staff. Notified counsel by telephone. Docketing to mail notices. Mail AO 450 form. docketing deputy initials Copy to judge/magistrate judge. OS MAR 13 AN 8: 48 date mailed notice courtroom

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## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

DONNA CRAWFORD,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No. 01-C-1198
	)	Magistrate Judge Schenkier
JO ANNE BARNHART,	)	
Commissioner of Social Security,	)	
•	)	
Defendant.	)	

## MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Commissioner of Social Security, Jo Anne Barnhart (the "Government"), has filed a motion to remand (doc. #26) this case for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Govt. Mot. at 1). The plaintiff, Donna Crawford, has declined to stipulate to a remand, contending that she is entitled to an outright award of benefits (Pl.'s Mem. at 2; Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 2). The Court gave both parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs addressing whether a remand should be entered pursuant to sentence four or sentence six. The plaintiff has filed both a response and a supplemental brief. The Government has not filed a supplemental brief. After review of the Government's motion, the Court finds that a remand order is appropriate under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which states in relevant part:

The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with our without remanding the cause for a rehearing.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2001).

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The plaintiff argues that she is entitled to outright reversal – even though she alternatively requested remand in her original motion – because the findings of fact in the record are "final" (Pl.'s Mem. at 2) and "complete" (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 2) and support only one conclusion: namely, that "the findings of the ALJ warrant reversal under the regulations and based on the testimony of the vocational expert (VE)." *Id.* The plaintiff resists remand at this point in the proceedings because it characterizes defendants' request as "another bite of the apple" to "give the same ALJ an opportunity to write a better denial." *Id.* The plaintiff also characterizes the request as one that seeks "an opportunity to void the supportive ME [Medical Expert] opinion" in the record – an opinion that cannot be elicited again from that particular ME, because he is now deceased. Instead, plaintiff asserts that the Government simply wants to "get a new ME opinion allowing the same ALJ to rewrite his decision based largely on the testimony" of the new ME (Pl.'s Mem. at 2). The Government, conversely, argues that the ALJ's opinion is "unclear" regarding several factual findings and thus should be remanded, rather than reversed, so that the Commissioner can clarify her position before the Court rules on the merits of plaintiff's claim.

If outright reversal were warranted here, that would be a sufficient basis upon which to deny the Government's motion for remand. But, the case law in this Circuit indicates that outright reversal of the Commissioner's final decision is warranted only if "the record can yield but one supportable conclusion," and there are no unresolved factual issues. *Campbell v. Shalala*, 988 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1993). Here, outright reversal is not warranted because factual issues remain unresolved. The primary issue identified by the Government in its motion is whether the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment, which incorporated the specific limitation that plaintiff needs to "elevate her leg up to sixteen inches two-to-three times per day" (R. 12-18), is inconsistent

with a not disabled finding at Step 5 of the sequential analysis. The Court agrees that the ALJ's RFC

assessment is inconsistent with other evidence in the record, such as the Vocational Expert's

testimony - testimony that the ALJ did not address - that such a limitation would entirely preclude

substantial gainful activity – even at the sedentary level. The Court also agrees that the plaintiff's

condition of obesity should be addressed by the ALJ, as required by Social Security Ruling 00-3p.

The Court finds that the identified inconsistency in the record (and other omissions) presents

questions for the ALJ that need clarification and perhaps modification on remand. Accordingly, the

Court grants the Government's motion for remand (doc. # 26); as a result, plaintiff's motion for

summary reversal and/or remand (doc. #23) is denied as moot. This case is therefore remanded

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further administrative proceedings consistent

with this Order.

Dated:

March 12, 2002

Enter:

Sidney I. S¢henkier

United States Magistrate Judge

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